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Wage Flexibility and Employment Fluctuations:  
Evidence from the Housing Sector 
 
By JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE 
London School of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
Many economists suspect that downward nominal wage rigidities in ongoing labor contracts 
are an important source of employment fluctuations over the business cycle but there is little 
direct empirical evidence on this conjecture.  This paper compares three occupations in the 
housing sector with very different wage setting institutions, real estate agents, architects, and 
construction workers.  I study the wage and employment responses of these occupations to 
the housing cycle, a proxy for labor demand shocks to the industry.  The employment of real 
estate agents, whose pay is far more flexible than the other occupations, indeed reacts less to 
the cycle than employment in the other occupations, although specific estimates are noisy.  I 
show that the aggregate implications of the estimates depend also on the aggregate labor 
demand elasticity, which captures how easily laid off workers can find employment in 
alternative sectors.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In the traditional Keynesian model, unemployment occurs during recessions because nominal 
wages are downwardly rigid.  Firms lay off works rather than lowering their wages in 
recessions.  Such explanations for employment fluctuations over the business cycles retain 
their appeal in modern discussions (e.g. Bewley, 2002).  While downward wage rigidity is 
well documented as I will discuss below, there is much less evidence linking wage rigidity 
directly to employment fluctuations or unemployment.  This paper intends to contribute to 
this debate by comparing the employment response of three different housing market related 
occupations, real estate agents, architects, and construction workers, to the housing market 
cycle.   
The focus on three such narrow occupations is interesting because pay arrangements differ 
substantially across these occupations.  Real estate agents receive most or all of their pay in 
the form of commissions.  As a result, the “wage” implicit in their employment arrangement 
is very flexible.  If the housing market turns down and prices fall or transactions dry up, the 
earnings of real estate agents drop commensurately.  There is no a priori reason for 
brokerages (the employers of agents) to lay off agents; the same number of agents could stay 
in their job at the new lower wage.  Of course, agents may decide to quit when employment is 
becoming less attractive as these workers move along their labor supply curve.  Architects 
and construction workers, on the other hand, are largely paid on standard wage and salary 
contracts, although overtime pay and bonuses, which provide some degree of flexibility, are 
common in these occupations.  As these occupations should also be affected by the housing 
cycle, they serve as a useful control group for the real estate agents. 
Apart from the different contractual arrangements, another attraction for studying the housing 
market are the large booms and busts, which have taken place in the market over the past 20 
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years.  Moreover, there are large differences in the amplitude of housing market cycles across 
different parts of the United States.  Figure 1 shows house prices in California, Indiana, and 
New York.  States on both coasts saw large run ups in prices during the 2000s while price 
increases were modest in in the Midwest.  The figure also shows that the bust in the housing 
market after 2006 was much more pronounced in California than in New York. 
In this paper, I am exploiting this variation in fluctuations in house prices and transactions 
across states and time in the 2000s.  I utilize these fluctuations as a proxy for labor demand 
shocks to the occupations under study.  The connection for real estate agents is a very direct 
one: their commission is a percentage of the transactions value so that the product of prices 
and transactions directly affects their earnings.  For architects and construction workers the 
connection is more indirect but new housing starts tend to be closely related to the cycle in 
house prices. 
I interpret fluctuations in the housing market as shocks to the labor demand for the 
occupations I study.  The compensation of both real estate agents and architects is small 
compared to the total value of houses or housing transactions so that shocks originating from 
the labor markets for these workers are unlikely to play any significant role in overall 
movements of the housing market.  For construction workers this may be more problematic 
as the costs of construction are a larger portion of new housing costs.  Nevertheless, the 
perception of most observers is that housing market fluctuations primarily stem from demand 
side pressures. For example, Glaeser et al. (2005) and Glaeser et al. (2008) explain the 
divergent housing cycles across US cities by an interaction of increasing housing demand and 
land use regulations.  Gyourko and Saiz (2006) find that construction costs did not contribute 
to the recent observed housing price cycles. 
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Combining data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Quarterly of 
Workforce Indicators (QWI) with real estate prices and transactions mostly for the first 
decade in the 2000s, I estimate the response of wages and employment in each of the 
occupations with respect to the value of transactions in the housing market.  Since the scaling 
of these responses will naturally differ depending on how directly the occupation is affected 
by these market fluctuations, my preferred measure is to divide the employment response by 
the wage response to obtain an elasticity which can be thought of as the labor supply or 
inverse wage setting elasticity for the occupation.  These estimates are effectively IV 
estimates of employment on wages instrumenting with housing market fluctuations.  These 
estimated elasticities line up according to the flexibility with which wages are set in the 
different occupations.  The estimated elasticities are around 2.5 for real estate agents, 2 to 4 
for architects, and 4 to 23 for construction workers.  However, the elasticity, particularly for 
construction workers, is estimated imprecisely because their wage response is very modest. 
I use a simple demand and supply framework of the labor market to interpret these results. 
This suggests that apart from the role of wage rigidity, the labor demand elasticity is an 
important factor determining to what degree demand shocks translate into employment 
losses.  One way of interpreting the demand elasticity is the ease with which workers in a 
specific sector might find other employment in the face of a downturn.  I present evidence 
that this might be easier for real estate agents than for the other occupations.  This effectively 
more elastic demand means that wage rigidity matters more for real estate agents then it does 
for construction workers.   
This paper relates to a large literature documenting pervasive downward nominal wage 
rigidity.   Prominent examples are Card and Hyslop (1997), Kahn (1997), and Altonji and 
Devereux (2000) for the US and Dickens et al. (2007), who report results from a consortium 
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assessing wage rigidity in 16 countries.1  While these papers are motivated by the importance 
of wage rigidity for employment fluctuations they focus on documenting the relative absence 
of negative nominal wage changes and how these relate to inflation.  On the other hand, this 
literature does not relate wage rigidity directly to employment fluctuations or labor demand 
shocks.   
An exception is the paper by Fehr and Goette (2005) for Switzerland, who correlate estimates 
of wage rigidity across different inflation regimes and cantons to unemployment rates.  They 
find that unemployment is higher when there is more “wage sweep up” due to nominal wage 
rigidity.  Inflation creates implicit variation in the bite of nominal wage rigidity but does not 
directly distinguish more or less flexible contracting arrangements. Hence, their paper 
demonstrates a link between wage rigidity and unemployment but does not show directly 
whether more flexible wage contracts would lead to less unemployment. 
Card (1990) relates employment fluctuations directly to contracts with more or less 
flexibility.  He exploits the wage indexing provisions of Canadian union contracts to estimate 
the employment response to unexpected price changes.  Union contracts which do not specify 
any indexing to future price changes fix nominal wages in either direction.  Unexpected 
inflation then resets the wage.  Card (1990) interprets the resulting employment fluctuations 
as movements along a labor demand curve.  This differs somewhat from the exercise I am 
interested in here, which is focused on the response of employment to labor demand shocks 
under different wage contracting regimes.  Instead of a labor demand curve I am trying to 
estimate how the wage setting schedule depends on the flexibility of wage contracts. 
Holzer and Montgomery (1993) are interested in the response of wages and employment to 
firm level demand shocks.  Using firm level data, they proxy demand shocks by sales growth.  
However, in a broad cross-section of firms, sales might reflect both demand and supply 
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conditions.  Kaur (forthcoming) studies agricultural labor markets in India, which allows her 
to construct a more credible measure of demand shocks due to rainfall.  However, her market 
is one for day laborers.  As a result, there is no context of a “layoff” in her setting.  Rather, 
she shows that an increase in the spot market wage due to favorable conditions in one year 
persists into the subsequent year when the reasons for the higher wage have dissipated, and 
this translates into lower employment.  This notion of rigid wages is more closely associated 
with rigidity in starting wages rather than the wages in ongoing employment contracts. But 
wages in new jobs are believed to be relatively responsive to labor market conditions in the 
US, see for example Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Baker et al. (1994), and Pissarides (2009). 
Most closely related to my investigation is a paper by Lemieux et al. (2012).  They separate 
workers into those who work on standard fixed wage contracts and those whose who receive 
part of their compensation as bonus pay.  Regressing wages, hours and earnings on a bonus 
pay dummy interacted with the unemployment rate (as a cyclical indicator) they find larger 
cyclical effects on wages in bonus jobs and larger effects on hours in fixed wage jobs.  
However, bonus pay is a relatively minor component of total compensation in many jobs, and 
my paper uses occupations with bigger differences in pay setting regimes.  Housing market 
fluctuations are also likely a better labor demand indicator than the unemployment rate.  
Also related is the study by Card et al. (1999) who correlate relative employment changes to 
changes in the cross-sectional wage distribution over time in a particular country.  This more 
aggregate investigation ranks three countries, the US, Canada, and France, by the relative 
rigidity of their wage setting institutions.  This is close in spirit to the informal ranking of 
three different occupations in my study. 
An important prior analysis focusing on real estate agents is the closely related exercise by 
Hsieh and Moretti (2003).  They also regress changes in real estate agent employment and 
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earnings on changes in house prices.  They find an elasticity close to 1 for employment and 
almost no response of earnings.  However, in contrast to my investigation they look at 
relatively long run (10 year) changes during a period when the housing market in the US was 
mostly booming.  They interpret their results as inefficient entry of workers into an industry 
where the commission rates on sales tend to be fixed irrespective of house price levels.  A 
relative elastic supply of real estate agents absorbs any potential wage gains as the proceeds 
are being spread across more workers.  My study focuses on year-to-year changes which are 
more likely to capture business cycle fluctuations.  In particular, my sample period includes 
the sharp downturn in many housing markets after 2006, which is relevant for the wage 
flexibility story.  Unlike my study, Hsieh and Moretti don’t compare wages and employment 
to any other housing related occupations.   
 
I. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Real estate agents and brokers facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers in the 
housing market.  An individual has to obtain a state license after completing some 
coursework in order to act as a real estate agent; the entry requirements for this occupation 
are not large.  After some experience and/or with additional education, individuals can 
qualify as a broker, which allows them to set up their own brokerage.2  A broker typically 
employs various agents, who will execute the sales of individual properties.  In most states 
and transactions, a seller enters a legal relationship with a brokerage.  The designated agent 
will carry out a number of specified services related to the transaction for the client.  These 
services include finding a buyer but typically also involve various legal obligations associated 
with the sale.  Clients pay a fee in the form of a commission on the sales price to the 
brokerage for these services.   
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Agents are employed by brokers on a variety of contracts.  The most common ones involve 
agents receiving a share of the commission revenue for their sales; this is often referred to as 
percentage commission splits.  Shares of 50 to 80 percent are common in the industry.  Few 
agents receive a fixed base salary or are paid solely on a salaried basis.  However, it is not 
uncommon for an agent to actually pay the broker a monthly fee while receiving a large share 
of their commission revenue, often 100 percent in this case.  In industry parlance these agents 
“pay for their desk.”  In addition to desk fees these agents typically cover their own business 
expenses (NAR RealtorMag, 2014a; NAR 2014; Shelef and Nguyen-Chyung, 2015). 
There is little precise information on the exact prevalence of flexible components of pay like 
commissions.  Various labor market surveys contain some coarse information, typically 
combining payments such as bonuses, commissions, and overtime pay.  The top panel in 
Table 1 displays the share of workers receiving pay from overtime, tips, and commissions 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the three occupations analyzed here.  
Potentially, all these pay components are related to performance and the amount of work 
available.  More than half the real estate agents respond they are receiving such flexible pay 
compared to 10 – 15 percent of architects and construction workers.  For construction 
workers this is presumably mostly overtime, which will lose its relevance once hours fall 
below the threshold for overtime pay.  As a result, overtime pay provides some wage 
flexibility in a downturn but wages eventually turn rigid.   
I augment the CPS results with information from industry sources.  According to the Member 
Profile of the National Association of Realtors (NAR), 95 percent for agents and brokers 
receive some flexible pay component, which in most cases will be commissions.  It is unclear 
why the CPS fraction is much lower.  NAR members are more likely brokers or more 
experienced and higher earning agents.  These groups tend to be on more high powered 
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contracts but these agents are also more likely to receive a salary.  However, if anything, this 
suggests that the fraction reporting commissions in the more representative CPS should be 
even higher. 
The second panel in Table 1 collates information on the share of pay that is due to the flexible 
pay components.  Unfortunately, I have only been able to locate such information from 
industry sources for architects and construction workers, for whom only 5 percent is due to 
such pay components.  The last number for construction workers on fringe costs of 19 percent 
is probably an overstatement for my purposes, as a large proportion of fringe costs is likely 
part of fixed pay, like employer contributions to health insurance premia.  Unfortunately, 
detailed information is not available for real estate agents but the numbers are likely to be 
substantially higher as commission shares below 50 percent are rare.  NAR (2014) reports 
that 13 percent of agents are on 100 percent commissions and 73 percent on percentage 
commission splits. 
One issue is whether we should think of agents as actually employed by brokers at all, or as 
effectively self-employed.  The IRS has rules as to when agents should be classified as 
independent contractors or employees.  States have their own rules, often based on common 
law guidelines, to determine whether agents are covered by unemployment insurance and 
workers compensation (NAR RealtorMag, 2014b).  For example, NAR (2014, exhibit 4-4) 
reports that 83 percent of their members are independent contractors and hence effectively 
self-employed.  However, it is important to keep in mind that almost half of the responses in 
this industry survey come from brokers rather than agents.   
On the other hand, 49 percent of real estate agents self-identify as employed in the sample 
from the ACS I use below.  This compares to 72 percent of architects and 75 percent of 
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construction workers.  In practice, many real estate agents seem to think of themselves as 
employees. 
Even if employed, the relationship of real estate agents to their employers may be a looser 
one than that of architects and possibly even construction workers to their firms.  When 
workers move in and out of their jobs more frequently, contracts are more likely to resemble 
spot market contracts while more attached workers may have (possibly implicit) long term 
contracts with their employers.  The current wage in a long term contract may not be the 
relevant value of compensation which matters for market clearing.  Unfortunately, we know 
relatively little about the nature of contracts in labor markets in general, and I am not aware 
of any relevant data for the occupations under consideration here.  However, in Table 2 I 
compare average tenure in the three occupations to get at least a view as to whether the 
differences in attachment are large.  The tenure data are from the CPS Tenure Supplements 
and the Displaced Worker Surveys. 
Both columns in the table display results from regressions of tenure on a constant and 
dummies for architects and construction workers.  The constant in these regressions reflect 
the average tenure for real estate agents, while the coefficients for the other occupations 
measure the difference in average tenure of that occupation from realtors.  Column 1 uses the 
Job Tenure Supplements to the CPS. Tenure here refers to the incomplete tenure in the 
current ongoing employment spell.  Real estate agents have about 5.7 years of tenure.  
Architects stay in their jobs about 20 percent longer with an average tenure around 7 years.  
Construction workers have more similar tenures to real estate agents; their point estimate is 
slightly negative. Column 2 shows results using data from the Displaced Worker Survey.  
Here, tenure refers to completed tenure in the job from which a worker has been laid off.  
Average tenure for these workers is shorter, and the differences across the occupation are 
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smaller and not significant, given the noisier estimates in this smaller sample.  But the 
general pattern is the same: real estate agents fall in between architects and construction 
workers.  Overall, realtors do not seem to be big outliers in terms of their attachment to their 
employers. 
The wage contracts of real estate agents closely approximate a simple, optimal agency 
contract we are used to seeing in a textbook.  Such a contract involves a negative intercept 
and a slope of 1.  Figure 2 illustrates how agent earnings are a function of the total value of 
transactions.  These values are the product of the average sales price of a property in market 
m (Pm) and the number of transactions (sales) agent i completes in a month (Sim).  Agent i’s 
earnings are  
(1) Yim = im + c Pm Sim 
where im is the base salary or desk fee,  is the share of the commission the agent receives 
(say 0.5), and c is the commission rate (e.g. 0.06) on the transactions value.  I use ln(Pm Sm) 
as my measure of labor demand shocks in the empirical analysis below, where Sm are market 
level sales.  As Figure 2 illustrates, agent earnings and wages fluctuate directly with 
transactions values in the housing market.   
Note that market level transactions are Sm = Sim, where the sum is over the Lm real estate 
agents working in market m.  Fluctuations in the housing market will directly affect Pm and 
Sm.  Hsieh and Moretti (2003) have shown that the number of active real estate agents Lm 
responds strongly to price booms, at least at a decadal horizon.  When housing demand goes 
up, Sm will rise but Sim could stay the same or fall if Lm expands enough.  Every agent simply 
sells fewer houses in a boom and agent earnings don’t expand in line with the house price 
increase.  In fact, Hsieh and Moretti (2003) find that average earnings of agents don’t rise in 
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booming markets.  I am using the market level ln(Pm Sm) as my cyclical indicator and I want 
this to affect agent earnings.  However, unlike Hsieh and Moretti, I am looking at annual data 
and I will show below that agent earnings are indeed responsive to ln(Pm Sm) at that 
frequency. 
The analysis in this paper is based on a simple demand and supply framework analogous to 
Card et al. (1999), where the wage setting institutions differ across occupational labor 
markets. Figure 3 illustrates this for two occupations, say real estate agents and construction 
workers.  Each occupation has a wage setting (or labor supply) curve and a labor demand 
curve.  The wage setting curve for construction workers is inelastic, reflecting the relatively 
rigid wages for this group of workers.  The wage setting curve for real estate agents is elastic 
as the wages for this group adjust flexibly to changes in the labor market.  Figure 3 shows a 
common labor demand curve for each of the two groups.  When labor demand shifts inwards, 
as during the housing bust from 2006 – 09, wages fall little for construction workers, while 
there is a large adjustment in employment.  The opposite happens for real estate agents where 
wages fall more and employment adjusts less.   
I treat the market indicator ln(Pm Sm) as a labor demand shifter, and interpret the ratio of the 
employment to the wage response to shocks as the inverse wage setting elasticity of the 
occupation.  One issue with using ln(Pm Sm) as a labor demand shifter for the first decade in 
2000s is that the boom and bust cycles in the housing market correlate strongly with the 
financial crisis and the general downturn of the economy.  Since labor demand and supply in 
Figure 3 are those to an occupation, supply depends crucially on job prospects for workers 
outside the occupation.  An inward shift in labor demand due to the housing bust during the 
2006 – 2009 period may therefore coincide with an outward shift of labor supply (or wage 
setting) because job prospects also deteriorated in other occupations at the same time.   
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I deal with this in two ways.  All regression models are estimated at the state level and 
control for aggregate time effects.  I.e. I only use the within state variation in ln(Pm Sm).  To 
the degree that the recession due to the financial crisis affected all states similarly this will be 
washed out by the time effects.  To address within state correlations of labor demand and 
supply shifts I also control for an “alternative wage” for the occupations under analysis.  This 
is given as the wage of all workers in the state with similar characteristics as the workers in 
the occupation under analysis, and described in more detail in the data section below.  It is 
not a perfect solution as this alternative wage is clearly an equilibrium object. 
 
II. DATA 
The analysis combines labor market data for real estate agents, construction workers and 
architects with data on the economic cycle in the housing sector. Data on the labor market 
come from the American Communities Survey (ACS) and from the Quarterly Workforce 
Indicators (QWI), housing sales transaction data are from the National Associations of 
Realtors (NAR) and sales prices from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).  Details 
about the data and variable construction are in Appendix 1. 
The ACS is a large-scale annual survey of the US population starting in 2000. I select real 
estate agents, architects, and construction workers and construct annual employment, average 
hourly wages, weeks worked per year, and usual hours worked per week for these 
occupations.  The hourly wage measure divides wage and salary income by annual hours 
worked.  Since the aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of rigidity in contracted wages, I 
exclude the self-employed in the analysis. The main analysis uses data aggregated at the state 
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and year level.  While metropolitan areas might be preferable, longer time series of house 
prices are available at the state level. 
To control for potential shifts in labor supply that coincide with demand shifts I construct a 
measure of workers’ “alternative wage.” This variable is meant to proxy for the outside 
option of workers. It is constructed as a weighted average of the wage of similar individuals 
working outside a given occupation. The weights are derived from a probit regression of 
working in a particular occupation on demographics. To illustrate the process consider the 
“alternative wage” of a real estate agent. I first estimate a probit model for working as a real 
estate agent on seven education dummies, race, a squared term in age, and an interaction of 
gender and marriage dummies. Then I calculate the weighted average wage of all non-real 
estate agents using the predicted probability of being a real estate agent as weight.  This 
procedure creates an average wage for workers in other occupations who look most similar to 
real estate agents in terms of observables.  
One drawback of the ACS is that samples for specific occupations at the state-year level can 
be small, leading to imprecise cell averages.  I therefore complement the ACS data with data 
from the QWI, which is mainly based on administrative records of the state unemployment 
insurance (UI) systems. While the QWI covers almost the universe of employment contracts 
in the US, its main drawback is that it excludes jobs outside of the UI system. This excludes 
the self-employed but potentially also other real estate agents because the commission-based 
contracts prevalent in the industry are exempted from UI coverage in a number of states.  
Apart from this under-coverage, the QWI inclusion rules will most likely capture the agents 
with the least flexible contracts. 
A second drawback is that the QWI only contains information by industry and not occupation 
of the workers. Therefore, I use the industries for Offices of Real Estate Agents and Brokers; 
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Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services; and for Residential Building Construction 
to mimic the three occupation groups in the ACS.  This introduces some measurement error 
as I also capture wages and employment of other occupations like secretaries who are likely 
on different contracts. The QWI data start at different points in time for different states 
mostly in the 1990s and early 2000s.  This leads to an unbalanced panel but allows me to 
extend the time period for some states. 
The labor market data is linked to data on the regional housing cycle. The data for the total 
value of housing transactions comes from two sources. The price data is taken from the 
annual series of house prices by the FHFA (formerly OFHEO). This data is based on 
mortgages bought by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.  The index is calculated using two 
mortgages on the same property and aggregating the data using the Case and Shiller (1989) 
method. The data used here use single-family residential properties only, the state level data 
start in 1991, and are published annually. Housing sales transactions are obtained from NAR 
for the years 1989 to 2010. This data is based on reports of local membership groups and 
again covers existing single-family homes. Combining the labor market and housing data 
leads to a panel spanning the years of 2000 to 2010 when using the ACS and an unbalanced 
panel for the years 1991 to 2010 when using the QWI. 
The data on fluctuations in the housing market should capture swings in the demand for the 
three occupations. My preferred measure is the annual value of house sales given by the 
product of the number of transactions and the average sales price. For real estate agents, this 
variable directly tracks the transactions values on which commissions are based. For the other 
two occupations, demand might be thought to be more closely related to the number of new 
construction projects. To address this point I collected data on the value of new housing 
permits issued in each year and state from the Census Bureau’s “Building Permits Survey.” A 
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regression of the ln of Construction Permits on ln Housing Prices and ln Transactions 
separately yields an R2 of 0.3 within states and years, and 0.2 when the regression is run on 
the product of prices and transactions (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). This suggests some 
differences in new construction and sales of existing homes but the value of housing sales 
should also capture demand shifts in architecture and construction fairly well.   
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 3 shows regression results from running wage and employment regressions of the form 
(2) ln(Yst) =  + p ln(Pst) + S ln(Sst) + s + t + est 
where Yst is the wage or employment outcome for realtors in state s and year t, Pst is the 
housing price index, Sst is the number of home sales, and s and t are state and year fixed 
effects, respectively.   Regressions are weighted by the number of working age individuals in 
a state.  Column (1) shows that a 10 percent increase in prices or sales translates into about 
1.5 percent higher hourly wages for real estate agents.  Even though the wage elasticity is 
well below 1, this seems like a substantial effect and is statistically significant.  We would 
expect an elasticity of 1 if the contracts for all agents were simply proportional (i.e.  = 0 in 
eq. (1) above), agent employment did not react to labor demand shocks, and transactions 
volumes Pst Sst were completely accurately measured.  None of these are likely to hold.  
Moreover, the regression is based on repeated cross-sections, and entry and exit effects will 
tend to bias the estimates of  down if less productive agents enter in booms.  In any case, the 
estimates are large compared to the zero effect found by Hsieh and Moretti (2003). 
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Since the coefficients on prices and sales are very similar as expected (although the p-value 
for a test of equality is only about 0.04) it makes sense to restrict them and work with the 
transactions value ln(Pst Sst) as in column (2) instead.  Adding the alternative wage for real 
estate agents in column (3) makes little difference to the result.  The estimate for the 
alternative wage is positive as expected but imprecise.   
Columns (4) to (6) repeat the same regressions for the number of realtors employed.  
Elasticities are around 0.5 to 0.6, suggesting substantial employment responses of realtors 
over the cycle.  This mirrors the result of Hsieh and Moretti (2003) that realtors respond to 
the housing cycle through entry and exit, and this will mute some of the wage effects of 
market fluctuations.  To gauge the size of this response we will have to compare realtors to 
other occupations, as we will do shortly.  The result in column (6) shows that the employment 
result is also relatively insensitive to entering the alternative wage, which is now negative. 
Columns (7) to (9) show results for the average number of weeks worked, and columns (10) 
to (12) for hours worked per week.  There seems to be no adjustment at the intensive margin 
as housing markets fluctuate.  If realtor wages are relatively flexible, we might expect a 
smaller employment response for this group but some adjustment on the intensive margin.  
One reason for the absence of an hours response might be the presence of desk fees in agent 
contracts, as illustrated in Figure 2.  Since these fees constitute a fixed cost of work, agents 
may not want to reduce their hours (very much) in response to housing busts but may still 
react by leaving the occupation or employment entirely.  However, many more agents are on 
percentage commission splits and may not pay any desk fees.  It is also surprising that there is 
not more of a response at the weeks margin.   
It is difficult to gauge whether the wage and employment responses of real estate agents to 
labor demand shocks are large or small by looking at this occupation in isolation.  Therefore, 
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I run similar regressions to eq. (2) for architects and construction workers.  Workers in these 
occupations are on much more standard fixed wage contracts with comparatively minor 
flexible components like overtime or bonuses.  One complication in comparing the  
coefficients for different occupations is that house price and sales shocks may affect real 
estate agents much more directly than the other occupations.  To circumvent this problem, I 
concentrate on the wage setting elasticity, given by the ratio empl/wage. This ratio is free from 
these scaling problems, since scaling should affect wage and employment results 
proportionally.  Notice that the inverse wage setting elasticity can be obtained from the 
regression of employment on wages 
 ln(Lst) = 0 +  ln(Wst) + 1s + 1t + st, 
instrumenting the wage by the demand shock ln(Pst Sst). 
Table 4 displays the results for the three occupations.  Column (1) repeats the estimates of the 
employment, weekly hours, and wage elasticities with respect to ln(Pst Sst) for real estate 
agents; these are the estimates from columns (5), (11), and (2) from Table 3, respectively.  
The fourth row gives the inverse wage setting elasticity, which is the ratio of the employment 
and wage estimates. This comes out to 2.8 for the real estate agents.  Columns (2) and (3) 
display the estimates for architects and construction workers.  Both employment and wage 
responses are lower for these occupations, as expected.  What is of more interest is the ratio 
in row (4) which is 2.0 for architects and 23 for construction workers.  The wage setting 
elasticity is imprecisely estimated because the wage effect in the denominator of the ratio is 
small for both these occupations.  The reduced form estimate for weekly hours in row (2) is 
uniformly small for all occupations; indicating little intensive margin response to labor 
demand shocks for any of the occupations. 
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Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4 repeat the same estimates with the QWI data.  Both the ACS 
and the QWI data have advantages and disadvantages.  The main strength of the QWI data is 
that they capture the universe of workers covered by the UI system, while the ACS samples 
are small for the specific occupations analyzed here.  Indeed, the QWI estimates are generally 
more precise.  The inverse wage setting elasticities are 2.2 for real estate agents, 4.3 for 
architects, and 3.5 for construction workers.3 
One caveat with these results is that the cyclical patterns of wage and employment responses 
may differ in the three occupations, and differences in the estimates might reflect this.  In 
Table 5, I also enter leads and lags of house transactions values in the regressions.  Because 
of the short time dimension of the panel at hand I limit the analysis to one lead and one lag.  
Even the estimates with one lead and lag are very noisy.  To the degree that a pattern 
emerges, it suggests that employment and wage responses are either contemporaneous or 
happen with a one year lag.  Maybe the employment responses of architects are slightly faster 
than for the other two occupations.  This would make sense as this occupation is engaged in 
the earliest stages of a building project and new construction plans may react first to changes 
in housing demand.4  In order to interpret the coefficients from the specification with leads 
and lags I also present the sum of the coefficients.  This is an estimate of the long-run 
response in a dynamic model.  The estimated inverse wage setting elasticities from this 
exercise are very close to those from the contemporaneous specification. 
Another issue with the estimates is that employment fluctuations may imply selection in who 
works over the business cycle.  As a result, changes in average wages may reflect both 
changes in wages for the employed individuals as well as this changing composition (see e.g. 
Solon et al., 1994).  If the worst workers leave their jobs in a downturn and join in a boom 
then wages will look less cyclical than they truly are.  This composition bias will be worse 
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the larger the employment fluctuations in an occupation.  Table 4 suggested that employment 
of realtors reacts most strongly to the transactions value indicator, and hence this occupation 
may suffer more from the composition bias in wages.  The true wage effect should therefore 
be larger, and the resulting inverse wage setting elasticity would be overestimated. 
In order to investigate whether this is potentially an important issue, I turn to data from the 
Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG).  Wages are 
collected twice from each surveyed household one year apart.  I match individuals across the 
two outgoing rotation groups where wages are collected.  This allows me to look at wages for 
entrants, leavers, and stayers in an occupation.   
Table 6 presents a regression of wages from the matched CPS sample on occupation entrants 
and leavers (with stayers as the base group and controlling for age).  Using hourly wages in 
the top panel suggests that entrants have broadly similar wages to stayers while leavers are 
slightly negatively selected.  The bottom panel uses weekly earnings, which are available for 
a slightly bigger sample at the cost of conflating wage and hours information.  The estimates 
are now consistently negative and larger in absolute value than for wages.  This suggests that 
there is some selection both on wages and on hours, and the selection is most heavily 
concentrated on leavers.  Selection turns out to be smallest for real estate agents but the 
differences are not massive.   
Unfortunately, occupation transitions are notoriously poorly measured in panel datasets (see 
Kambourov and Manovskii, 2013). An incorrect coding of the occupation in one period will 
lead to spurious entry and exit from the occupation.  Realtors may have more spurious 
transitions.  Annual entry and exit rates for realtors in the matched CPS data are 56 and 47 
percent, respectively.  This is much higher than what we would expect from the tenure data in 
Table 2.  If entry and exit followed a Poisson process, average incomplete tenure of 5.7 years 
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in the CPS Tenure Supplements suggests completed tenure of 11.4 years, which translates 
into annual steady state flows of 9 percent.  This means less than 20 percent of the observed 
transitions in the merged CPS data may be true transitions, and the estimates in Table 6 may 
be substantially attenuated as a result.  However, the estimates for the other occupations 
would be attenuated as well.  While spurious transitions are somewhat less important for 
architects and construction workers, using similar calculations for the other occupations 
suggests that this phenomenon does not reverse the conclusions from Table 6. Wages and 
earnings of entrants and leavers seem to be lower than those of stayers but the differences 
across occupations are slight. 
 
Time series results 
An important issue for the macroeconomic implications of these results is whether 
employment flows to and from the housing occupations is to non-employment or to other 
occupations.  If workers who lose their jobs because of rigid wages quickly find employment 
elsewhere then the aggregate implications of rigid wages may not be very important.  The 
story is different if most of these job losses result in unemployment. 
The ACS and QWI data are not suited for addressing this question because they do not allow 
me to measure flows directly.  I therefore use the longitudinal data on individuals from the 
CPS constructed above to build a time series of employment and employment flows from 
1980 to 2016.  I am turning to a national time series because the sample size in the CPS is too 
small to analyze occupations within state (and it is small even to analyze these occupations at 
the national level).   
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Note that employment at time t obeys the flow equation Lt - Lt-1 = Entryt - Exitt.  
Approximating ln(Lt) - ln(Lt-1) by (Lt - Lt-1)/ Lt-1, we can write the time series version of eq. 
(2) in first differences as  
 (Lt - Lt-1)/ Lt-1 = Entryt/Lt-1 - Exitt/Lt-1  
≈  + p{ln(Pt) - ln(Pt-1)} + S{ln(St) - ln(St-1)} + et 
It is possible to estimate this equation either for the total employment change or for inflows 
and outflows separately.  Moreover, inflows and outflows can be further disaggregated into 
flows to and from other occupations and flows between the occupation in question and non-
employment.  Because of the spurious transitions problem I will only show results for total 
employment change and for entry and exit between the occupation and non-employment.  As 
a result, entry and exit coefficients will not add up to those for total employment changes.  
Finally, I only use the price term on the right hand side of the equation because the 
transactions data do not go back into the 1980s, and the time series has few observations as it 
is.  The quality of these time series does not seem to be high.  Apart from the spurious 
transitions problem discussed above, the series for entry from other occupations and—as a 
result—total employment changes seem extremely volatile from year to year.   
With these caveats in mind, Table 7 displays the results.  Overall employment elasticities are 
much larger than those in Table 4 but remember that we are now using the entire time 
variation including national time effects in the estimation.5  More interesting than the overall 
employment elasticities is how much of these effects is accounted for by entry and exit.  For 
construction workers, exit from employment accounts for all of the cyclical fluctuations in 
employment change while entry is not cyclical.  For architects, entry is also not cyclical and 
exit accounts for about half the total employment elasticity.  For realtors, both entry and exit 
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is cyclical.  Exit accounts for about 15 percent of the total and entry another 10 percent.  This 
means 75 percent of the employment flows for realtors are to and from other employment. 
The results suggest that exits matter for all three occupations but real estate agents may have 
more flows to and from other occupations and self-employment as well.  Some of these may 
be spurious but note that unsystematic occupation miscoding should lead to attenuation here 
as well and not produce the large estimates in the first row of Table 7.  The estimates suggest 
that real estate agents have more flows to other employment which are related to the housing 
cycle.   
  
IV. INTERPRETATION 
I will interpret the differences in employment responses of real estate agents and the other 
occupations through the lens of a very simple, competitive labor market model.  The 
estimates for the wage setting elasticity are not particularly precise and the specific results 
differ between the ACS and QWI estimates, so I will consider a range of estimates.  The 
inverse wage setting or labor supply elasticity for real estate agents is most consistently 
estimated at a value around 2.5.  The most rigid occupation seems to be construction workers 
but their elasticity varies between 4 in the QWI and 23 in the ACS.   
Consider the most standard supply and demand model of the labor market.  If wages were 
completely fixed, a labor demand shock would translate one for one into a change in 
employment.  I will use this as the benchmark of a most rigid labor market.  Consider the 
same labor market model but now set the inverse wage setting or supply elasticity to  < .  
Employment then would contract by a fraction /( + ) for a one unit shock to labor 
demand, where  is minus the elasticity of labor demand.  Column (4) of Table 8 displays 
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values for this employment response for a labor demand elasticity of  = 0.5 as in Card 
(1990).6  For realtors with a  = 2.5, employment would decline by 83 percent of the 
benchmark case.  For a more rigid occupation with  = 4 the employment decline is 89 
percent and with  = 23 it is 98 percent.  Low and behold, the employment responses are not 
very different because labor demand is inelastic.  With perfectly inelastic demand, the supply 
elasticity plays no role for the employment response at all; employment always contracts by 
the full amount.   = 0.5 is small enough that we are close to the inelastic case.   
But the standard one sector model is likely too simple, particularly for real estate agents, who 
may be moving to employment in other sectors when they leave realtor jobs.  Augment this 
model with a second sector so that labor demand is now 0 in the own sector and 1 in the 
alternative sector.7 The estimated supply elasticity is the supply to the own sector, 0.  
Workers move between sectors freely, so wages are the same in both sectors.  In this case, a 
fraction (0 -1)/( + 0) of workers would move to non-employment for a one unit labor 
demand shock to the own sector.  Results for this calculation are shown in the last column of 
Table 8.  In the first three rows I set 1 = 0 = 0.5.  This makes little difference when wages 
are rigid like in the  = 23 case but it mutes the employment response for more flexible 
wages, like the  = 2.5 case for real estate agents in the first row.  Only 67 percent of workers   
become unemployed compared to 83 percent without an outside sector.  The demand and 
supply elasticities interact here, and some workers gain employment in the alternative sector 
as wages are now allowed to fall in response to the labor demand shock in the initial sector. 
But the alternative sector may not simply be a single sector similar in size to the first. For 
example, real estate agents may have various possibilities of alternative employment.  They 
could work as mortgage brokers, they may sell insurance, or take a clerical job and each of 
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these alternative occupations could be considered a single sector.  In other words, there could 
be multiple alternative sectors.  Adding a third sector would simply replace the labor demand 
elasticity for sector 1 by the sum the demand elasticities for both alternative sectors. As a 
result, it is possible to think of additional sectors simply as more elastic labor demand in 
sector 1: this “sector” more easily absorbs additional workers.  
It is now possible to think of the one sector responses as the employment losses in the own 
sector.  Some of the workers affected by the decline in labor demand in the own sector find 
employment in other sectors in the multi-sector model.  The multi-sector response shows the 
actual loss of employment.  These two parts can be mapped into the total employment 
response in line 1 of Table 7, and the sum of entry and exit from the labor market in lines 2 
and 3.8   
Table 8 shows calculations for values of 1 of 1 and 1.9.  I chose these values so that the 
ratios of the one to multiple sector employment response in the  = 2.5 case (real estate 
agents) are about 60 percent and 25 percent, respectively.  The 25 percent number is taking 
the estimates in Table 7 at face value that only 25 percent of employment fluctuations of real 
estate agents are to and from non-employment.  The 60 percent number asserts that roughly 
half of the remaining estimate is non-sensical, and hence presents an intermediate case.   
In the most extreme case if the outside demand elasticity were 1.9, real estate agents would 
find it easy to find other jobs.  Only 20 percent of the initial job losses would translate into 
non-employment.  In contrast, in the rigid construction sector, 90 percent of workers would 
still become unemployed.  But construction workers may have fewer outside opportunities 
(and this was suggested by the results in Table 7) so the one sector response of 98 percent 
might still be the relevant one.  Even in the intermediate case of 1 = 1, the capacity of other 
sectors to absorb employment losses for real estate agents is sizeable. 
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This discussion suggests that the comparison of real estate agents and construction workers 
suffers from the drawback that these occupations differ not just in terms of the flexibility of 
their wage setting institutions but also in terms of the alternatives available to workers in the 
face of a job loss.  The model allows us to separate these two effects.  Instead of comparing 
an employment response of 20 and 98 percent, we want to compare either within the one 
sector or the multiple sector model only.  In the one sector case, moving from very inflexible 
wage setting as for construction workers ( = 23) to a flexible scenario as for real estate 
agents ( = 2.5) would not reduce employment losses very much.  85 percent of workers 
(0.83/0.98) would still become unemployed even with more flexible wages.  Doing the 
opposite calculation for real estate agents in the multiple sector case means that flexibility 
helps a lot.  In the most extreme scenario with 1 = 1.9, wage flexibility reduces employment 
losses to 22 percent (0.20/0.90).  Even the intermediate scenario with 1 = 1 means a 
reduction to 53 percent (0.50/0.94).  This highlights an important role of alternative job 
opportunities in mediating the effect of flexibility on employment outcomes.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a sizeable literature on downward nominal wage rigidity and many economists 
believe that this is a source of employment fluctuations over the business cycle.  
Nevertheless, there is not much evidence linking rigid wages directly to employment 
outcomes as I have done here.   I do indeed find that the wages of real estate agents react 
relatively more and employment relatively less to labor demand shocks than they do for 
architects and construction workers, who tend to have more rigid wage setting institutions.  
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Comparing narrow occupations which work in a highly cyclical industry is attractive because 
we have a good sense how pay setting institutions differ across these occupations. 
But focusing on narrow occupations also has shortcomings.  Neither the ACS nor the QWI 
are ideal data sources for this exercise and results are noisy.  It is therefore comforting that a 
fairly consistent pattern of results still emerges from both data sets. The data sets are repeated 
cross-sections rather than true panels, so the estimates likely suffer from composition bias.  
However, this does not seem to impact the three occupations differentially. 
A more important issue is that real estate agents may have more outside job opportunities, 
and some of their employment flows are to and from employment in other occupations or in 
self-employment.  I use a very simple supply and demand framework to show that this is an 
important issue.  More generally, the discussion highlights that the employment response to 
demand shocks depends heavily on the labor demand elasticity as well.  This is not a quantity 
this research strategy is able to assess directly but it is a crucial part of the aggregate 
consequences of wage rigidity. 
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NOTES 
                                                            
1 Despite this evidence, there is considerable debate about the importance of nominal wage 
rigidity.  For example, the absence of wage cuts may be due to measurement error in survey 
data.  Elsby et al. (2016) show that wage cuts are much more frequent in administrative data 
(which have their own problems) than in survey data, and conclude that wages of many job 
stayers were reasonably flexible during the Great Recession. 
2 Specific regulations and nomenclature differ across states. 
3 In Appendix 1 Table A3 I replicate the ACS results using industries as in the QWI data.  
However, little specific insight emerges from this comparison.  
4 In Appendix 1 Table A2 I probe the dynamic relationship between building permits and 
transactions and prices in a similar way.  No clear evidence emerges that permits lead the 
housing cycle. 
5 Employment effects in Table 4 without time effects are generally larger as well but not to 
the same extent. 
6 Hamermesh (1993) puts the consensus estimate of the own elasticity of labor demand even 
lower at 0.35 
7 Details about the setup of the model and the derivations are in Appendix 2. 
8 In steady state, employment losses that occurred in recessions have to be made up by 
employment gains in booms.  As a result, in this simple model adding the entry and exit rates 
is the correct metric to assess the flows with non-employment. 
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FIGURE 2. Contract of a real estate agent 
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FIGURE 3. The labor market for housing related occupations 
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TABLE 1. 
 PREVALENCE OF FLEXIBLE PAY IN HOUSING RELATED OCCUPATIONS 
Occupation Source Year Occupation definition 
Flexible pay 
definition 
Value 
(Percent) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share of workers receiving flexible pay 
Real estate agents CPS MORG 
1991-
2010 Census Code 
Overtime, tips, 
commissions 51 
Real estate agents NAR 2013 Sales Agents & Brokers 
Workers with 
flexible pay 
component 
95 
Architects CPS MORG 
1991-
2010 Census Code 
Overtime, tips, 
commissions 12 
Construction workers CPS MORG 
1991-
2010 Census Code 
Overtime, tips, 
commissions 13 
Share of flexible pay in income for workers receiving it 
Architects AIA 2011 
Architect excl. 
managerial 
roles 
Overtime, bonus, 
and incentive 
compensation 
5 
Construction workers Dietrich Surveys 2014 
Construction 
coordinator 
and field 
engineer 
Diff between base 
pay and all 
earnings (excl. 
overtime) 
5 
Construction workers PAS 2014 Journeymen All trades 
Fringe costs to 
firms (excl. 
overtime) 
19 
 
Sources 
NAR: NAR (2014), Exhibit 3-1: sales agents with commissions or profit sharing; AIA: AIA 
(2011), Exhibit 1-5: architects and designers in all firms; Dietrich Surveys: Personal email 
correspondence with Wayne Dietrich on July 31, 2014; PAS: PAS (2014), p. 7, average 
fringe. 
Notes 
CPS percentages in the top panel refer to employed workers only; percentage from the NAR 
refers to sales agents. 
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TABLE 2. 
JOB TENURE IN HOUSING RELATED OCCUPATIONS 
Occupation CPS Tenure Supplements DWS 
 (1) (2) 
   
Average tenure real estate agents (constant) 5.70 4.04 
 (0.17) (0.44) 
   
Architects 1.28 0.51 
(0.38) (1.05) 
   
Construction workers -0.15 -0.77 
(0.18) (0.45) 
   
No. of observations 13,361 2,346 
 
Notes 
Coefficients from a regression of years of tenure with the current or past employer on a 
constant and dummies for architects and construction workers in a sample representing the 
three occupations.  Samples from the CPS for 1996-2016 using the Tenure Supplements and 
the Displaced Worker Surveys. Regressions are weighted using the provided sampling 
weights.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
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TABLE 3.  
WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT CYCLICALITY OF REAL ESTATE AGENTS  
 Dependent variable 
 ln hourly wage ln employed individuals ln average weeks ln average weekly hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
ln HPI (P) 0.144   0.674   -0.002   -0.032   
 (0.066)   (0.135)   (0.025)   (0.023)   
             
ln sales volume (S) 0.158   0.292   0.010   -0.004   
 (0.075)   (0.102)   (0.025)   (0.019)   
             
ln HPI x sales  0.153 0.121  0.425 0.426  0.006 0.007  -0.014 -0.011 
  (0.060) (0.070)  (0.089) (0.097)  (0.022) (0.026)  (0.017) (0.024) 
             
ln alternative   0.539   -0.009   -0.018   -0.052 
wage   (0.494)   (0.708)   (0.178)   (0.225) 
             
No. of observations 559 559 559 555 555 555 559 559 559 559 559 559 
             
p-value for equality 
of P and S 0.038   0.000   0.861   0.360   
 
Notes 
The regressions are based on state-year observations spanning the period from 2000 to 2010. All models include year and state fixed 
effects and are estimated using weighted least squares, with the number of working age individuals in a state as weights. The dependent 
variable is constructed by aggregating individual data from the ACS at the state-year level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
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the state level. 
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TABLE 4. 
WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT CYCLICALITY OF DIFFERENT HOUSING RELATED OCCUPATIONS 
 ACS by occupation QWI by industry 
 Realtor Architect Construction Realtor Architect Construction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Employment effect 0.425 0.188 0.288 0.386 0.293 0.497 
 (0.089) (0.137) (0.066) (0.082) (0.065) (0.094) 
       
Weekly hours effect -0.014 -0.073 0.030    
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.007)    
       
Wage effect 0.153 0.095 0.012 0.173 0.069 0.140 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.016) (0.039) (0.022) (0.051) 
       
Inverse wage setting elasticity 2.77 1.97 23.54 2.23 4.27 3.55 
 (1.04) (1.54) (28.88) (0.73) (0.90) (1.34) 
       
No. of observations (see note) 559 539 559 667 667 667 
 
Notes  
Sample period is 2000-2010 for the ACS and 1991-2010 for the QWI. ACS groups are based on occupation, QWI groups based on 
industry. The employment regressions have 555, 515, 559 observations for realtors, architects and construction workers respectively due 
to empty cells.  Cycle variable is total value of house transactions (price x volume). Average wage is the hourly wage for ACS, the 
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monthly wage for QWI. Regressions are weighted with the number of working age individuals in a state as weight.   Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the state level. 
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TABLE 5. 
WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT REGRESSIONS WITH LEADS AND LAGS IN THE ACS 
 Realtor Architect Construction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: ln employed individuals 
       
Lagged ln HPI x sales  0.399  0.093  0.346 
  (0.140)  (0.242)  (0.075) 
       
ln HPI x sales 0.425 0.158 0.188 0.277 0.288 -0.031 
 (0.089) (0.167) (0.137) (0.383) (0.066) (0.068) 
       
Lead ln HPI x sales  -0.056  -0.226  0.076 
  (0.149)  (0.261)  (0.079) 
       
Sum of effects 0.425 0.501 0.188 0.144 0.288 0.392 
 (0.089) (0.131) (0.137) (0.178) (0.066) (0.083) 
       
No. of observations 555 502 515 468 559 506 
Dependent variable: ln hourly wage 
       
Lagged ln HPI x sales  0.009  0.177  0.045 
  (0.073)  (0.123)  (0.024) 
       
ln HPI x sales 0.153 0.110 0.095 -0.140 0.012 -0.013 
 (0.060) (0.093) (0.058) (0.176) (0.016) (0.045) 
       
Lead ln HPI x sales  0.076  0.115  -0.016 
  (0.075)  (0.138)  (0.033) 
       
Sum of effects 0.153 0.195 0.095 0.152 0.012 0.017 
 (0.060) (0.085) (0.058) (0.082) (0.016) (0.018) 
       
No. of observations 559 506 539 490  559 506 
       
Inverse wage setting  2.77 2.56 1.97 0.95 23.54 23.41 
elasticity (1.04) (1.12) (1.54) (1.17) (28.88) (23.25) 
       
 
Notes 
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Sample period is 2000-2010.  Regressions are weighted with the number of working age 
individuals in a state as weights.   Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state 
level. 
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TABLE 6. 
 REGRESSION OF EARNINGS ON TRANSITION STATUS 
 Realtor Architect Construction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: ln hourly wage 
    
Entrant 0.028 -0.021 -0.065 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.005) 
    
Leaver -0.021 -0.089 -0.085 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.005) 
    
No. of observations 13,081 3,891 83,837 
Dependent variable: ln weekly earnings 
    
Entrant -0.029 -0.040 -0.095 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.006) 
    
Leaver -0.078 -0.120 -0.113 
 (0.022) (0.035) (0.006) 
    
No. of observations 14,453 4,006 79,624 
 
Notes 
Reported results are coefficients of weighted least squared regressions of the outcome 
variable on a quartic in age, entry and exit dummies (stayers are the omitted category) using 
the CPS sample weights. Samples are based on longitudinal matches of CPS Merged 
Outgoing Rotation Groups. Data span 1980-2016. Wages are ln hourly wages in 1983 dollars. 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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TABLE 7. 
TRANSITIONS IN AND OUT OF EMPLOYMENT 
 Realtor Architect Construction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
∆Employmentt/Employmentt-1 1.342 0.527 0.779 
 (0.582) (0.414) (0.301) 
    
Entryt/Employmentt-1 0.212 0.013 -0.052 
 (0.091) (0.102) (0.122) 
    
Exitt/Employmentt-1 -0.267 -0.252 -0.584 
 (0.092) (0.138) (0.104) 
    
 
Notes 
Regressor is ln(HPIt)- ln(HPIt-1). Samples are based on longitudinal matches of CPS Merged 
Outgoing Rotation Groups.  There are 37 annual observations from 1980-2016. Regressions 
are unweighted and standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. 
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TABLE 8. 
EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS AS A FRACTION OF COMPLETELY RIGID WAGE CASE 
Own sector 
supply 
elasticity 
Demand elasticity Employment response 
Own sector Other sectors One sector Multiple sectors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2.5 0.5 0.5 0.83 0.67 
4 0.5 0.5 0.89 0.78 
23 0.5 0.5 0.98 0.96 
2.5 0.5 1 0.83 0.50 
4 0.5 1 0.89 0.67 
23 0.5 1 0.98 0.94 
2.5 0.5 1.9 0.83 0.20 
4 0.5 1.9 0.89 0.47 
23 0.5 1.9 0.98 0.90 
 
Notes 
Employment responses to a unit shock based on a supply and demand model of the labor 
market with one or multiple sectors (see text for details). 
 
 
 
 
 
